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Abstract
We consider the well-analyzed abatement game (Barrett 1994) and prove that correlation among
the players (nations) can strictly improve upon the Nash equilibrium payoﬀs. As these games are
potential games, correlated equilibrium — CE — (Aumann 1974, 1987) cannot improve upon Nash;
however we prove that coarse correlated equilibria — CCE — (Moulin and Vial 1978) may do so. We
compute the largest feasible total utility and hence the eﬃciency gain in any CCE in those games:
it is achieved by a lottery over only two pure strategy profiles.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Many environmental problems can be suitably investigated and analyzed using diﬀerent game theoretic
models and solution concepts (see Folmer et al 1998, Finus 2001, Missfeldt 2002 and Wood 2011 for
books and surveys on this area). For example, think of a problem faced by a few countries, each of
which emits a pollutant that damages a shared environmental resource. A well-studied model from the
literature called the abatement game (Barrett 1994) studied this issue as a non-cooperative game played
by several countries choosing the level of abatement. In this set-up, any country’s payoﬀ is the benefit
from abatement minus the cost of abatement where each country’s benefit is assumed to depend on the
total abatement while the abatement cost is assumed to depend on its own abatement level.
For a non-cooperative model such as the abatement game, it is fairly natural and acceptable to
analyze the Nash equilibrium of the game and then compare this equilibrium outcome with the eﬃcient
outcome of the model (that maximizes the joint payoﬀ). Indeed, the literature confirms that in this
class of games, the Nash equilibrium is suboptimal although it actually can be very close to the eﬃcient
outcome. However, considering the magnitude of costs and payoﬀs involved in these games, even a small
eﬃciency loss can indeed be a huge amount in practice. Therefore, it is important to look for other
solution concepts within the non-cooperative framework to improve upon the Nash outcome.
Several (non-cooperative as well as cooperative) solutions have already been analyzed for the abate-
ment game; for instances, Barrett (2001) and McGinty (2007) studied asymmetric versions of the abate-
ment game. Barrett (1994) also considered the Stackelberg model of abatement which was later analyzed
by Rubio and Ulph (2006). Finus (2003) presented generalization of Barrett’s results in terms of the
number of countries in a stable equilibrium. However, the impact of correlation has not been analyzed.1
We believe that the concept of correlation for normal form games has a very natural interpretation
in the abatement game. A correlation device is a lottery over the outcomes (strategy profiles) of a given
normal form game. A correlated equilibrium (Aumann, 1974, 1987; thereafter CE) is implemented2 by a
mediator who selects strategy profiles according to a publicly known probability distribution and sends
to each player the private recommendation to play the corresponding realized strategy. The equilibrium
property is that each player finds it optimal to follow this recommendation. In a coarse correlated
equilibrium3 (Moulin and Vial 1978; thereafter CCE), the mediator requires more commitment from
the players: it asks the players, before running the lottery, to either commit to the future outcome of the
1Forgó, Fülöp and Prill (2005) and Forgó (2011) recently used (modified versions of) Moulin and Vial’s notion of
(coarse) correlation in other environmental games. Baliga and Maskin (2003) surveyed some models of mechanisms in this
literature.
2However, not fully, as shown by Kar, Ray and Serrano (2010).
3 In their paper, Moulin and Vial (1978) called this equilibrium concept a correlation scheme. Young (2004) and
Roughgarden (2009) introduced the terminology of coarse correlated equilibrium that was later adopted by Ray and Sen
Gupta (2013) and Moulin, Ray and Sen Gupta (2014), while Forgó (2010) called it a weak correlated equilibrium.
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lottery or play any strategy of their own without learning anything about the outcome of the lottery.
The equilibrium property is that each player finds it optimal to commit ex ante to use the strategy
selected by the lottery.
In the context of climate change negotiation, in particular for the abatement game, a correlation
device can be interpreted as an independent agency providing a recommendation to all relevant countries
towards the ultimate goal of global emission reduction. In a CCE of the abatement game, each country
remains free to revert to a non-cooperative emission, but does not benefit from doing so as long as other
countries commit to the policy selected by the agency.
To the best of our knowledge, in the literature on game theoretic applications in environmental
economics, correlation, in either the CE or the CCE format, has been mostly ignored. It was recently
discovered that CE cannot help improving upon the Nash equilibrium in many important microeconomic
games. Liu (1996) and Yi (1997) proved that the only correlated equilibria in a large class of oligopoly
games are mixtures of pure Nash equilibria, a result later on generalized by Neyman (1997) and Ui
(2008) to all potential games with smooth and concave potential functions. The abatement game is also
a smooth potential game and hence its only CE is the (unique) Nash equilibrium.
In this paper, we show that the abatement game has many CCEs. In the cases that has been
identified below, some of these CCEs are strictly more eﬃcient than the Nash equilibrium outcome. We
apply the general methodology introduced in Moulin, Ray and Sen Gupta (2014) to compute the most
eﬃcient CCE in a symmetric 2-person abatement game with quadratic payoﬀ functions. We show that
the optimal CCE is a symmetric mixture of two pure outcomes. Thus, a mediator by using such a CCE
can help the countries to choose abatement levels that will generate higher (expected) payoﬀs than that
in the Nash outcome.
To understand our contribution, consider for example the following numerical model of an abatement
game with two countries where country  (= 1 and 2) chooses a non-negative abatement level  with
payoﬀs
1(1 2) = (1 + 2)− 2(1 + 2)2 − 21 ; 2(1 2) = 1(2 1).
The Nash equilibrium for this game is ( 110  110), with corresponding payoﬀ (for either country) of 11100 =
011. For this particular numerical example, the eﬃcient (total) payoﬀ that the countries can jointly
achieve is 29 ≈ 02222. Thus the Nash equilibrium (total) payoﬀ 022 is 99% eﬃcient, that is, the ratio
of the total payoﬀ in the Nash equilibrium and the eﬃcient (total) payoﬀ is 099. In this game, consider
a mediator using the lottery that chooses two outcomes ( 11+
√
3
104  11−
√
3
104 ) and (
11−√3
104  11+
√
3
104 ) each with
probability 12 . That is, the mediator asks the countries to commit to the future outcome of the lottery
in which, with equal probability, one country abates  = 11+
√
3
104 while the other chooses
11−√3
104 .
The above lottery is clearly not a CE because (11+
√
3
104  11−
√
3
104 ) is not a Nash equilibrium of this game.
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But it is a CCE: if country 1 chooses any 1 and assumes country 2 is choosing either 11+
√
3
104 or
11−√3
104
with equal probability, its expected payoﬀ [15261 − 321 + 11104 − (11+
√
3
104 )
2 − ( 11−√3104 )2] is maximized at
1 = 552 and gives 1 = 2992704 , precisely the same as by committing to follow the outcome of the above
lottery , that generates the expected utility of 1() = ( + 0) − 2( + 0)2 − 12 (2 + 02), where
 0 = 11±√3104 . Thus 1() = 2992704 ≈ 01105.
More importantly, we prove below that this lottery is actually the optimal CCE, with the total
payoﬀ  = 21() = 5982704 = 23104 ≈ 02211. Clearly, it is an improvement over the Nash outcome.
The optimal CCE in this example has an improvement ratio  of
575
572 ≈ 10052, yielding just about
1
2% increase over and above the Nash equilibrium payoﬀ. So the optimal CCE only incurs about 12% of
eﬃciency loss compared to the eﬃcient outcome. As mentioned earlier, given the magnitudes involved,
1
2% gain can indeed be a big achievement.
We generalize below the argument presented in this example and formally characterize the optimal
CCE for any 2-player abatement game (Theorem 1) under the assumption that the benefit parameter
() is bigger than the cost parameter () in the payoﬀ function in the model, after showing that the
inequality    is actually necessary to allow any improvement at all.4 The total payoﬀ at the optimal
CCE is very close to the eﬃcient payoﬀ for this class of games, with a clear improvement above the
Nash equilibrium total payoﬀ.
As already mentioned, we apply the general algorithm in Theorem 1 of Moulin, Ray and Sen Gupta
(2014) to compute the most eﬃcient CCE in a general symmetric 2-person game with quadratic payoﬀ
functions. This algorithm is too complex to deliver a general closed form solution; in our earlier work,
we derived closed form solutions for two special cases, respectively, for a Cournot duopoly and a public
good provision game. The class of abatement games is another subset of the quadratic games, for which
Theorem 1 below identifies the optimal CCE in a closed form.5 The optimal CCE is a 2-dimensional
anti-diagonal symmetric lottery similar to those studied by Ray and Sen Gupta (2013) who called such
a lottery a Simple Symmetric Correlation Device (SSCD) as introduced in Ganguly and Ray (2005) to
discuss correlation.
The contribution of this paper is two-fold. First as a theoretical exercise, our result is perhaps
the first attempt of characterizing the benefit from (coarse) correlation in choosing abatement levels by
countries. Second, as the importance of enforcing agreements is an important theme in the environmental
literature, our characterization suggests why and how a mediator (an independent agency) could be used
for agreements and commitments in abatement games in practice; a mediator can improve upon the
4Gerard-Varet and Moulin (1978) proved that Nash equilibrium can be locally improvable by using a concept similar
to CCE under a condition, which for this game, perhaps not surprisingly, also turns out to be   .
5Note that the class of public good provision and that of abatement games diﬀer only in the cost term which is linear
there and quadratic here. This diﬀerence however changes the entire analysis; for instance, in the public good provision
game, the support of the optimal CCE is on the axis, which never happens here.
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Nash equilibrium outcome by using the optimal CCE which is just a lottery over two outcomes that the
countries would agree to commit to.6 Of course, there are a few limitations of our result; admittedly,
our analysis is restricted to two countries only with a specific payoﬀ function. However, as mentioned
above, full characterization of the optimal improvement by (coarse) correlation is not easy to achieve
and thus marks a contribution in this literature. We discuss further limitations of our work at the end
of this paper.
We formally present the two-person abatement game in Subsection 21 and define CCEs for normal
form games in Subsection 22. Section 3 presents the main result characterizing the optimal CCE for
the 2-player abatement game while Section 4 concludes with some remarks.
2 MODEL
2.1 Abatement Game
We present below the model proposed in Barrett (1994) with two countries ( = 2).
The payoﬀ function of a country is a function of the abatement level chosen by both countries 1
and 2. Let us write the total abatement as  ( = 1+2) and therefore we have the benefit function7
of country  as
() = 
2
(− 
2
2
)
The cost function of each country is a function of its own abatement level  and is given as
() = 
2
2

The payoﬀ function of country 1 (and similarly for country 2) is thus given by
1(1 2) = 
2
(1 + 2)− 
4
(1 + 2)2 − 
2
21 , where ,  and  are all positive.
We now set  = 2 ,  = 4 ,  = 2 for simplicity and rewrite the above payoﬀ function in the
following form:
1(1 2) = (1 + 2)− (1 + 2)2 − 21 ; 2(1 2) = 1(2 1). (1)
We call the above game an abatement game.
6Although we cannot point to a precise example in real life, our abstract mediator embodies in spirit the kind of
commitment shown in the 1992 United Nation Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC) that several authors
have analysed (see for example Slechten 2013).
7Note that the benefit function in the published version of Barrett (1994) has a typo that we have corrected here.
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Given 2, the best response of country 1 (similarly, for country 2) is 1(2) = 1(12)1 =  −
2(1 + 2)− 21.
Thus the Nash equilibrium (1  2 ) and the corresponding (total) payoﬀ  are given by
1 = 2 = 2(2+ ) ; 
 = 
2(4+ 3)
2(2+ )2 .
We now compute the eﬃcient abatement levels (1  2 ). To maximize the total payoﬀ 1(1 2)+
2(1 2) = 2(1+ 2)− 2(1+ 2)2− (21 + 22), we clearly need to choose 1 = 2; it is easy to prove
that
1 = 2 = 4+  ; 
 = 2
2
4+  .
Therefore, the relative eﬃciency ratio of the Nash outcome is  = (4+3)(4+)4(2+)2 , where  =  ,
which can be viewed as a function of . Note that this ratio decreases slowly from 1 (when  = 0) to
3
4 (at  =∞); however, in the region relevant to our analysis (0 ≤  ≤ 1, as we will explain later), the
ratio  decreases only from 1 to
35
36 = 09722 (see Figure 1 below).
2.2 Coarse Correlation in Games
We present here the notations and definitions used in Moulin, Ray and Sen Gupta (2014), for the sake
of consistency and completeness.
Consider a two-person normal form game,  = [12;1 2], where the strategy sets, 1 and 2,
are closed real intervals and the payoﬀ functions  : 1 ×2 → R,  = 1 2, are continuous.
Let L(1 × 2) with generic element  and L() with generic element  denote the sets of
probability measures on 1 ×2 and  respectively. Let the mean of (1 2) with respect to  be
denoted by ().
The deterministic distribution at  is denoted by , and for product distributions such as 1 ⊗ 2
we write (1 ⊗ 2) simply as (1 2).
Definition 1 A coarse correlated equilibrium (CCE) of the game  is a lottery  ∈ L(1 ×2) such
that
1() ≥ 1(1 2) and 2() ≥ 2(1 2) for all (1 2) ∈ 1 ×2. (2)
Following Ray and Sen Gupta (2013), Definition 1 above can be presented for any finite -person
normal form game, [ {}∈  {}∈ ], with set of players,  = {1  }, finite pure strategy sets,
1  with  = Q∈ , and payoﬀ functions, 1  ,  :  → <, for all . For such a
game, a probability distribution  over  is a CCE if for all , for all 0 ∈ , P∈ ()() ≥P
−∈− (−)(0 −), where (−) =
P
∈ ( −) is the marginal probability distribu-
tion over − ∈ −, for any deviant  ∈  while the others commit to .
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3 RESULTS
The abatement game is a potential game for the potential function  (1 2) = (1+2)− (1+2)2−
(21 + 22), which is smooth and concave. Therefore, the only correlated equilibrium (a la Aumann) is
the Nash equilibrium  (Neyman 1997).
Our goal in this paper is to compute for the abatement game the CCE that maximizes the total
payoﬀ 1+2 and to compare this joint payoﬀ with the eﬃcient payoﬀ and the Nash equilibrium payoﬀ.
As the abatement game is symmetric, we can limit our search to symmetric lotteries  only (as
explained in Moulin, Ray and Sen Gupta 2014, when one identifies an optimal symmetric CCE, one also
captures an optimal CCE among all CCEs, symmetric or otherwise). We denote the set of symmetric
lotteries by L(R2+).
We first characterize the equilibrium condition (2) presented in Definition 1 in terms of three moments
of . If  is the distribution of the symmetric random variable (1 2), these are respectively the
expected values of , 2 , and 1 · 2 as denoted below.
 = [1];  = [21 ];  = [1 · 2]
Proposition 1 A symmetric lottery  ∈ L(R2+) is a CCE of the abatement game if and only if
max≥0 {(− 2) − (+ )
2} ≤ − (+ ) − 2 (3)
and the corresponding utility (for a country) is
1() = 2− (2+ ) − 2.
Proof. First note that the expected utility (for a country) from any lottery  ∈ L(R2+) can be
written as
1() = [1] + [2]− [21 ]− [22 ]− 2[1 · 2]− [21 ],
which by symmetry is
1() = 2[1]− (2+ )[21 ]− 2[1 · 2]
= 2− (2+ ) − 2.
We write the expected payoﬀ when country 1 plays a pure strategy  and country 2 commits to ,
as
1( 2) =  + [2]− 2 − [22 ]− 2[2]− 2
= (− 2) − (+ )2 + − .
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Hence,  is a CCE if and only if
max≥0 {(− 2) − (+ )
2}+ −  ≤ 2− (2+ ) − 2,
which, after rearranging, gives us the condition in the statement.
The next subsection presents our main result.
3.1 Optimal CCE for the Abatement Game
The following theorem characterizes the utility maximizing CCE for the abatement game.
Theorem 1 ) If  ≤ , the Nash equilibrium of the abatement game is its only CCE.
) If   , setting  =  , the optimal values of the three moments of the utility maximizing  are
given by (e e e):
e =  2 + 2− 22(4 + 5) ,
e = 22 4 + 8+ 2 − 434(4 + 5)2 and e = 22 4 + 8− 2 − 43 + 244(4 + 5)2 ;
while the optimal CCE is e = 12(0) + 12(0), with
 0 = 
2 + 2− 2 ± 
p
1− 2
2(4 + 5) .
Using Theorem 1, one can compute the maximum payoﬀ obtained by the CCE e (when   ).
Corollary 1 The payoﬀ function (of a country) at e is
1(e) = 12 − 2 [22 (2 + 2− 2)24(4 + 5) − 242 ] = 2 4 + 4− 24(4 + 5) .
3.1.1 Example
We illustrate our main result above by revisiting the example in the Introduction more formally. Con-
sider the following values of the parameters,  = 1,  = 2 and  = 1 in the abatement game. Here,
 =  = 12  1 and the payoﬀ function is given by 1(1 2) = (1 + 2)− 2(1 + 2)2 − 21, with Nash
equilibrium abatement levels,  = 2(2+) = 110 .
From Theorem 1, the corresponding optimal values of the moments are:e = 11104 ≈ 01057,e = 312704 ≈ 00114 ande = 595408 ≈ 00109.
Thus the optimal CCE is the lottery e = 12(0) + 12(0), where  0 = 11±√3104 , that chooses two
outcomes (11+
√
3
104  11−
√
3
104 ) and (
11−√3
104  11+
√
3
104 ) each with probability
1
2 , as mentioned in the Introduction.
From Corollary 1, the corresponding expected payoﬀ (for one country) derived by playing this CCE
is 1(e) = 2992704 ≈ 01105.
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3.2 Eﬃciency Performance of the Optimal CCE
We now compare the (total) payoﬀ from the optimal CCE  = 21(e), with both the eﬃcient and
the Nash equilibrium (total) profits. To analyze the performance of (coarse) correlation, we are going
to use the terminologies presented in Ashlagi et al (2008).
We call the ratio between the total payoﬀ from the optimal CCE to the total payoﬀ obtained in the
Nash equilibrium the mediation value; similarly, let the enforcement value denote the ratio between the
maximum total payoﬀ obtained in a CCE to the maximal welfare (total payoﬀ) in the eﬃcient outcome.
We can now calculate the enforcement and mediation values for the abatement game recalling
 = 2
2
4+  =
2

2
4 +  and 
 = 
2(4+ 3)
2(2+ )2 =
2

4 + 3
2(2 + )2 .
Corollary 2 For the abatement game, the enforcement and mediation values depend only upon  =  ,
as follows:
Enforcement Value =

 =
(4 + )(4 + 4− 2)
4(4 + 5) for 0 ≤  ≤ 1,
Mediation Value =

 =
(2 + )2(4 + 4− 2)
(4 + 5)(4 + 3) for 0 ≤  ≤ 1;

 = 1 for  ≥ 1.
Corollary 2 on the enforcement and mediation values is shown in Figures 1 and 2. In Figure 2,
we have plotted the ratios  (as in Corollary 2 above) and

 (as stated earlier in Subsection
21) together to show that indeed coarse correlation improves upon Nash in the relevant range of the
parameter (0 ≤  ≤ 1).
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.1
0.96
0.97
0.98
0.99
1.00
c/b
CCE/Eff, NE/Eff
Figure 1: Enforcement value and  in the abatement game
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Figure 2: Mediation value in the abatement game.
3.2.1 Example (continued)
We revisit again our baseline example. In the example, the optimal CCE (total) payoﬀ is  =
21(e) = 23104 ≈ 02211, while the eﬃcient (total) payoﬀ is  = 29 ≈ 02222 and the Nash equilibrium
(total) payoﬀ is  = 1150 ≈ 022 (and hence 

 = 099, as mentioned earlier).
Using Corollary 2, the corresponding values here are: enforcement value =  =
207
208 ≈ 09951 and
mediation value =  =
575
572 ≈ 10052.
4 REMARKS
We have analyzed coarse correlated equilibria in a class of 2-person symmetric games called the abate-
ment game where correlation a la Aumann does not oﬀer anything more than the Nash equilibrium.
Incorporating the techniques introduced by Moulin, Ray and Sen Gupta (2014), we have character-
ized the utility maximizing CCE and have shown that they have a very simple support with only four
deterministic strategy profiles. Moreover, as we mentioned already, the benefit of using the optimal
CCE in the abatement game can be huge even though in percentage terms the achievable improvement
may not seem significant. Such a computation is the first of its kind for coarse correlated equilibria for
the abatement game and, this is why we regard this exercise as an interesting first step towards more
sophisticated computations to understand mediation in general for such games.
Some remarks are in order.
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Clearly, there are limitations of our approach. First, we have used a quadratic payoﬀ function,
and not any general diﬀerentiable concave function. This is not just because it enables us to use
the techniques identified in Moulin, Ray and Sen Gupta (2014). This choice has been justified in the
literature (such as the RICE model in Nordhaus et al 2000) that tries to set up abatement cost functions
fitting real data. Quadratic approximation is indeed a natural choice for payoﬀs as shown in the models
by Bosetti et al 2009, Finus et al 2005, Klepper et al 2006.
Also, we have worked with the assumption of identical nations for simplicity. We postpone the work
on asymmetric countries for future research.
Our characterization is only for a 2-player game. Although it is unclear how our main result could be
generalized in a game with  players, our conjecture is that CCE can improve upon the Nash equilibrium
outcome in an abatement game with  countries. It is of course true that the eﬃciency of the results
depends heavily upon the number of nations. Consequently, our paper does not address the important
issues of participation decisions and abatement levels.8
Finally, we do not relate our work to the important issues of coalition formation and applications of
coalitional form games, which are now perhaps standard approaches in the literature on the International
Environmental Agreements (IEAs).9 We are aware of the issues on the structures of (self-enforcing) IEAs
to analyze the interaction among countries and their behaviors to arrive at a final outcome (Barrett
2003, Finus 2008, McGinty 2007 for example) which are beyond the scope of our current paper.
8Finus (2003) showed that full participation and the eﬃcient outcome is obtained with only two players.
9 See, for example, Tulkens (1998) and the references therein.
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5 PROOF OF THE MAIN THEOREM
Proof of Theorem 1 involves a couple of known lemmata that we present below for the sake of com-
pleteness. The first is due to Moulin, Ray and Sen Gupta (2014). It identifies the range of the vector
(  ) when  ∈ L(R2+) and also shows that this range is covered by two families of very simple
lotteries with at most four strategy profiles in their support.
Let L∗ be the subset of L(R2+) containing the simple lotteries of the form  = 2( + 00) +

2 (0 + 0), where , 0,  and  are non-negative and  +  = 1. Let L∗∗ be the subset of L(R2+)
of the form  =  ·+0 ·00+ 2 (0+0), where , , 0 and  are non-negative and +0+ = 1.
Lemma 1 ) For any  ∈ L(R2+) and the corresponding random variable (1 2), we have
  ≥ 0;  ≥ ;  +  ≥ 22; (4)
) Equality  =  holds if and only if  is diagonal: 1 = 2 (a.e.);
) Equality  +  = 22 holds if and only if  is anti-diagonal: 1 + 2 is constant (a.e.);
) For any (  ) ∈ R3+ satisfying inequalities (4), there exists  ∈ L∗ ∪ L∗∗ with precisely these
parameters.
Note that (4) implies  ≥ 2, with equality  = 2 if and only if  is deterministic, because  = 2
implies both  =  and  +  = 22.
The proof of Lemma 1 can be found in Moulin, Ray and Sen Gupta (2014) and thus is omitted here.
Lemma 2 below states a two-step algorithm to find the utility maximizing CCEs using Lemma 1
and Proposition 1 (stated earlier in this paper).
Lemma 2 Given the abatement game, the following nested programs generate the utility maximizing
CCEs:
Step 1: Fix  non-negative, and solve the linear programme
min {(2+ ) + 2} under constraints
 ≥  ≥ 0;  +  ≥ 22; (+ ) + 2 ≤ −max≥0 {(− 2) − (+ )
2}.
Step 2: With the solutions () () found in Step 1, solve
max {2− (2+ )()− 2()} under constraints
 ≥ 0; max≥0 {(− 2) − (+ )
2} ≤ − (+ )()− 2().
Moreover, there is a utility maximizing CCE in L∗ ∪ L∗∗.
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Lemma 2 is similar to Theorem 1 in Moulin, Ray and Sen Gupta (2014) and hence the proof is
omitted.
We are now ready to prove Theorem 1. First, consider the equilibrium condition (3) as in Proposition
1. Note that if  − 2  0 ⇐⇒   2 , the L.H.S. of that inequality (the maximum over  ≥ 0) is
zero; therefore, (3) becomes
 ≥ (+ ) + 2 = ( + ) +  +   ( + ) ≥ 22,
which is a contradiction. So, we must have  ≤ 2 ; then the L.H.S. of (3) is (−2)
2
4(+) . The equilibrium
condition is now
(+ ) + 2 ≤ − (− 2)
2
4(+ ) = −
22 − (2+ )+ 24
+  . (5)
We now fix  and solve Step 1 in Lemma 2: we must minimize (2 + ) + 2 in the polytope
Ψ = {( )| ≥   +  ≥ 22} under the additional constraint (5). Note that Ψ is unbounded
from above and bounded from below by the interval [], where  = (2 2) and  = (22 0). We
distinguish two cases here.
Case 1 ( ≤ ): In this case, the minimum in Ψ of both (2 + ) + 2 and ( + ) + 2 is
achieved at  . Therefore, if  meets (5) it is our optimal pair (() ()); otherwise, there is no CCE
for this choice of . Now,  meets (5) if and only if (3+ )2 ≤ − 22−(2+)+
2
4+ , which reduces to
[−(2+ ))]2 ≤ 0 ⇐⇒  = 2(2+) =  . By Lemma 1, the optimal CCE  is diagonal ( = )
and deterministic ( = 2). It is simply the Nash equilibrium  =  of our game.
Case 2 (  ): Here, the minimum of (+ ) + 2 in Ψ is achieved at ; so, if  fails to meet
the constraint (5) there is no hope to meet it anywhere in Ψ. Thus, we must choose  such that
2(+ )2 ≤ −
22 − (2+ )+ 24
+  ⇐⇒ Λ() = (3
2 + 4+ 22)2 − (2+ )+ 
2
4
≤ 0 (6)
The discriminant of the right-hand polynomial Λ() is 2(2 − 2); therefore, (6) restricts  to an
interval [− +], between the two positive roots of Λ(). For such a choice of , the constraint (5) cuts
a subinterval [] of [], where  meets (5) as an equality. Note that  =  only if  =  (from
Case 1 and the fact that Λ( )  0), otherwise  6=  . Clearly,  is our optimal choice (() ())
and it solves the system
 +  = 22; (+ ) + 2 = −
22 − (2+ )+ 24
+  .
Therefore,
() = 12 − 2
∙
(5+ 4)2 − (2+ )+ 
2
4
¸
and
() = 12 − 2
∙
−(32 + 4+ 22)2 + (2+ )− 
2
4
¸
.
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Now in Step 2 of Lemma 2, we must maximize 2 − (2 + )() − 2() under the constraints
 ≥ 0 and Λ() ≤ 0. Developing this objective function yields the program
1
2 − 2 max {−
2(4+ 5)2 + (22 + 2− 2)− 
2
4
} (7)
under the constraints
 ≥ 0 and Λ() = (32 + 4+ 22)2 − (2+ )+ 
2
4
≤ 0.
The unconstrained maximum of the objective function is achieved at e = (22+2−2)22(4+5) .
We now show that Λ(e) ≤ 0. With the change of variable  =  , this amounts to
(3 + 4+ 22)(2 + 2− 2)2
4(4 + 5)2 −
(2 + )(2 + 2− 2)
2(4 + 5) +
1
4
≤ 0
⇐⇒ 4 + 8− 52 − 123 + 34 + 45 − 26 ≥ 0
The above polynomial is 0 at  = 1; it is also easy to check, numerically, that it is non-negative on
[0 1]. The proof of is complete if we now express e, e and e in terms of . This is indeed easy for e.
One may also verify, using the expression for e that
e = (e) = 12 − 2
∙
(5+ 4)e2 − (2+ )e+ 2
4
¸
=
2
2
4 + 8+ 2 − 43
4(4 + 5)2 and
e = (e) = 12 − 2
∙
−(32 + 4+ 22)e2 + (2+ )e− 2
4
¸
=
2
2
4 + 8− 2 − 43 + 24
4(4 + 5)2 .
Finally, we construct the optimal CCE e. From e + e = 2e2 and Lemma 1(), we see that e is
an anti-diagonal lottery of the form e = 12(0) + 12(0), where  and 0 are non-negative numbers
such that  + 0 = 2e and 2 + 02 = 2e. This implies 20 = (2e)2 − (2e) = 2e, hence  0 solve
2 − 2e + e = 0. The discriminant is e2 − e = e − e2 = 22 2(1−2)4(4+5)2 ; thus the expressions for  and
0 follow.
Corollary 2 can also be proved now. From the expression (7) of the payoﬀ 1(e) and the expression
of e in Theorem 1), straightforward computations provide the expressions presented in Corollary 2.
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